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ABSTRACT. Physical laws are irresistible. Logical rules are not. That is why logic is said to be normative. Given a sys-
tem of logic we have a Norma, a standard of correctness. The problem is that we need another Norma to 
establish when the standard of correctness is to be applied. Subsequently we start by clarifying the senses in 
which the term ‘logic’ and the term ‘normativity’ are being used. Then we explore two different epistemo-
logies for logic to see the sort of defence of the normativity of logic they allow for; if any. The analysis 
concentrates on the case of classical logic. In particular the issue will be appraised from the perspective put 
forward by the epistemology based on the methodology of wide reflective equilibrium and the scientific 
one underlying the view of logic as model. 
Keywords: normativity, logic, wide reflective equilibrium, view of logic as model. 
 
1. Logic is normative 
It is clear that logic has traditionally been considered as normative. But, let us not take 
anything for granted and try to understand what this means. First, we need to state 
what we understand by logic. The term ‘logic’ is ambiguous in that it can be under-
stood as what Peirce called, following medieval logicians, logica utens the rules that a 
given subject, or community of subjects, usesor as what he called logica docensthe 
set of theories that logicians have developed. In what follows we will use the term ‘lo-
gic’ in the second sense given above. 
 The task of logical theories (logica docens) has been frequently depicted as that of de-
veloping theories for the evaluations of arguments. Following Burgess, the Kneales, 
and many others we claim that it should be obvious that “logic as a discipline could 
not develop until the practice of rational argumentation had flourished” (Resnik, 1985, 
p. 230). In the same line, Corcoran (Corcoran 1973) has claimed that before Aristotle 
developed his conception of proof a large amount of proofs had already been ob-
tained. Therefore, since logical theories developed after rational argumentative prac-
tice, in what follows, our bank of data will consist in a certain type of rational argu-
mentative practice: The arguments and proofs in classical mathematical practice. My 
emphasis on mathematical practice intends to leave aside the problems pointed out by 
Resnik (Resnik, 1985, p. 227) in relation to the issue of using logical theories to de-
scribe a “natural practice”: 
“First, when we speak of our logical practice, whose practice do we have in mind? Ours qua pro-
fessional logicians and philosophers? Ours qua rational and educated adult members of our cul-
ture? And what do we mean by practice? Are we concerned with inferential behaviour as exhibited 
in the arguments we write and endorse, the inferential choices we make, and our responses on 
1 I would like to thank participants in the Seminar on Normativity (Granada, February 12-13, 2004) for their 
useful comments. 
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tests of reasoning? Or are we interested in our considered judgements of logical cogency? If we 
construe “practice” so broadly that it includes answering questions on the tests of reasoning used 
in some psychological studies, then it appears that no extant logical theory has a chance in the 
world of capturing our practice.” (Resnik, 1985, p. 227.)  
 Crispin Wright has answered some of the questions posed by Resnik above; in par-
ticular, Wright defines a practice as  
“… any form of intentional, purposeful activity.” (Wright, 1992, p. 15.) 
And a move as 
“… any action performed within the practice, for its characteristic purposes…” (Ibid.) 
In our case classical mathematical practice is a purposeful activity and logic studies it, 
therefore, logic studies the moves performed in classical mathematical proofs. And lo-
gic, for its part, is a practice too, one whose methodology is as well that of proof.  
 Next, we need to elucidate what is meant by a ‘normative’ feature of a given prac-
tice. Wright defines it in the following terms: 
“Various proposals are no doubt possible, but we should recognise straight away a distinction be-
tween descriptive and prescriptive claims about normativity. A characteristic of moves in a par-
ticular practice is a descriptive norm if, as a matter of fact, participants in the practice are posi-
tively guided in their selection of moves by whether a proposed move possesses that characteris-
tic. […] By contrast, a characteristic of moves supplies a prescriptive norm just in case the reflec-
tion that a move has that characteristic provides a […] reason for making, or endorsing, or per-
mitting it, even if such reasons tend, for the most part, to go unacknowledged by actual partici-
pants.” (Wright, 1992, p. 15.) 
According to the definition of ‘move’ above, it currently seems obvious (though it 
took a long time to come to it) that introduction and elimination rules for logical con-
nectives reflect the moves underlying mathematicians practice.2 Hence, those rules in 
themselves are not prescriptive like Resnik has pointed out (Resnik, 1985, p. 236). 
However, they are descriptive of classical mathematical practice, that is to say, they are 
rules such that participants in the practice are “positively guided in their selection of 
moves” by the fact that they are instances of the introduction and elimination infer-
ence rules for the logical constants. Other examples of descriptive rules could be: in 
case one has to choose among several rules, pick any rule that allows us to shorten a 
proof, one that takes us directly to the conclusion, and so forth. But, it is also possible 
to enunciate rules that are normative of classical mathematical practice. For instance, 
one prescriptive rule for classical mathematical practice is the following meta-rule: an 
inference rule will be permitted only if it is truth preserving.3  
 Thus, since the object and method of logic is mathematical proof, in as much as 
logic tries to formulate norms (whether descriptive or prescriptive), logic is about the 
norms underlying classical mathematical practice. But does this convey that logical 
practice itself is normative? Well, since the method of logic is also proof (the same 
2 The remark about how long it took to formulate the introduction and elimination rules for logical con-
stants has been taken from a comment by Neil Tennant on the internet forum “FOM”, 
http://www.cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/1998-January/001042.html. 
3 Being truth-preserving is a compulsory rule. 
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method of mathematicians), and we have established that mathematical practice basi-
cally consists in obtaining proofs and that there is at least one prescriptive rule under-
lying mathematical practice, the same sort of rule should underlie logical practice too. 
In fact, if one analyses classical logical practice one can see that ‘being truth-
preserving’ is in force also in the case of classical logic. Moreover, it can be said that 
underlying the practice of different logical theories there are diverse prescriptive rules. 
For instance, if the practice considered is that of classical logic, then it is clear that lo-
gical systems have to satisfy a minimum requisite for them to be interesting: they have 
to be sound. And there is a lot of discussion about whether completeness should also 
be mandatory for a logical system to be such.4 But if the logical theory considered is 
that of intuitionistic logic or paraconsistent logic, the minimum requisites will be diffe-
rent. In the case of intuitionistic logic, harmony seems to be a key requirement any 
system must satisfy in order to be interesting. Therefore, there are different logical 
practices, and consequently there are diverse standards, different descriptive and pre-
scriptive rules. The fact that diverse logical practices exist brings in many classical pro-
blems in the philosophy of logic, for instance, whether there ought to be one logic or 
many, the problem of which logic is the right logic, and so forth.  
 In order to make perspicuous what is at stake here, it seems important to differen-
tiate among the following concerns: 
– One matter is whether classical mathematical practice is normative. Corre-
sponding to this we have argued that classical mathematical practice is norma-
tive in that there are descriptive and prescriptive norms underlying that prac-
tice. 
– Another problem is whether logical practice is normative. In relation to this 
we have made the case that logical practice is normative in that there are both 
descriptive and prescriptive rules underlying it. 
– Finally a third question is whether logical theories are to be understood as 
descriptive accounts of a normative prescriptive practice —that of classical 
mathematics— or as normative accounts of a normative prescriptive practice, 
again that of classical mathematics. 
 Resnik has clearly formulated the distinction between a descriptive theory of a pre-
scriptive practice and a prescriptive theory about a prescriptive practice:  
“Whenever a community has a practice, the project of developing a theory of it suggests itself. 
When the practice is one of evaluation, a distinction must be made between descriptive and pre-
scriptive theories thereof. The former aims to describe explicitly what the community’s implicit 
standards have been: the theory is itself evaluated by how well it agrees with the facts of the 
community’s practice. The latter presumes to prescribe what the community’s standards ought to 
be: the community’s practice is evaluated by how well it agrees with the norms of the theory.” 
(Resnik, 1996, p. 12.) 
4 See Jané (in print) for a very interesting argument in favour of considering completeness as a necessary 
requisite. 
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The third issue above is thus whether logical theories are descriptive or prescriptive in 
relation to mathematical practice. In a sense, in order to establish whether a particular 
logical theory is in fact descriptive or prescriptive of a given practice what we have to 
do is to see whether it describes the practice (in our case, of classical mathematical 
proof) or whether on the contrary it aims at establishing how it should be. Thus, for 
instance, if the logical theory we are considering is classical logic, it is clear we can say 
that it is descriptive of classical mathematical practice; while, if the logical theory that 
is being analysed is that of intuitionistic logic, then it clearly does not depict the moves 
in classical mathematical practice. Yet, the development of intuitionistic logic aimed at 
prescribing that the current moves in force in classical mathematical practice should 
be replaced by those described in intuitionistic logic. In other words, though intuitio-
nistic logic by itself is inadequate to account for the moves in force in classical mat-
hematical practice, proponents of intuitionism claim, on well-known philosophical 
grounds, that intuitionistic logic should be used as the underlying logic of mathema-
tics, and, subsequently, that mathematical practice should be modified. Yet, since tho-
se philosophical claims have failed to convince the majority of mathematicians to 
abandon classical mathematical practice, it can be said that they do not provide an 
adequate basis to support intuitionistic logic. This brings us back to our problem; na-
mely, on what basis can a logical theory be vindicated, if any. 
 Note that if we consider category theory, instead of classical mathematics, it seems 
that intuitionistic logic can be seen as a descriptive theory of its underlying logic. That 
is so because the moves underlying the practice seem to match the moves depicted by 
intuitionistic logic. 
 In what follows we will try to formulate one possible way in which a given logical 
theory could defend itself as the underlying logic of classical mathematics. In doing so, 
we will claim that one appealing way to justify that a given logic should be used is not 
that it adequately models our inferential behaviour, or that it matches the judgements 
accepted by a given community, but that only that logic (or any other extensionally 
equivalent one in the relevant sense to be clarified) allows us to unveil a particular set 
of truths, a set of truths that is relevant for the explanation of an ‘independent’ en-
deavour. 
2. Physics, history of philosophy of science, linguistics, ethics and logic 
In this section our purpose will be to analyse how things work in other areas in order 
to elaborate a comparative analysis with logic. We will be considering the cases of 
physics (and other clearly scientific subjects such as medicine), history and philosophy 
of science, ethics and linguistics. In particular, we will be interested in seeing how the 
passing from the descriptive to the normative goes. 
 Let us start with physics. Physical laws are irresistible. Physical objects cannot but 
obey them.5 Logical rules are not. As we claimed above, that is why logic is said to be 
normative while physics is not. The laws of physics do not correspond to any inten-
5 Railton (2000, p. 4) points out that the same goes for conceptual necessity. 
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tional and purposeful activity. They are not norms. Yet, there are some prescriptive 
rules that are taught to children and whose support is, for instance, our knowledge of 
physics or medicine. By way of illustration, we teach our children not to jump from 
any window in a high building in order to preserve their safety. The basis for this pre-
scriptive rule is quite clearly that we know that we, as physical objects, cannot but 
obey physical laws, and one of the laws of Newton says that any body will fall…6 The 
normative force of rules like the one we are considering is huge. We also teach our 
children not to smoke in order to live a life as long and healthy as possible, but the 
normative force of this rule is not so big, because not smoking is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for living a long and healthy life. Yet, the normative force of both the rules 
above comes on one side from our medical knowledge about the effects smoking has 
on our health and on the other from our knowledge of physics. So we come before a 
human practice, that of living, and there are some very clear prescriptive norms in re-
lation to it. The normative force of the rule comes from our scientific ‘knowledge’ and 
depends to a great extent on the confidence the underlying scientific theory provides. 
It also hinges on the goals we assume; thus arguments of the sort of the following are 
very popular among smokers: smoking (or eating or drinking, etc) is a pleasure and 
what do I want life for if I cannot enjoy my most dear pleasures! 
 Now, an interesting question to pose is that of how much revisionism we can tol-
erate about these norms. It is clear that in relation to the first norm —“don’t throw 
yourself out of a high window”— no revisionism can be tolerated if the law of New-
ton is true and if we want to continue living. As to the second case, it could only be 
rejected if our best medical theories eventually concluded that our current beliefs 
about the evil effects of smoking were wrong, if our current medical theory proved 
false and an alternative medical theory was developed or if we changed our goals. 
And, this is it for science. 
 Paul Thagard (Thagard, 1982) has analysed the model for passing from the de-
scriptive to the normative in the area of history and philosophy of science.7 He abbre-
viates de method as “HPS” and describes it as follows: 
“1. We select cases of actual scientific practice. Selection is made on the basis of subsequent 
events in the history of science which have marked the cases as significant contributions to the 
growth of scientific knowledge. 
2. We develop case studies which describe scientific practice. 
3. We assume —or this can be argued for— that scientists have generally been successful in 
achieving the epistemic goals of science.  
4. Then the actual methods of the scientists in our case studies are at least an approximation to 
what the methods ought to be. We describe the methods found. 
6 Of course we know that from practice, but in this case I will consider the scientific explanation underly-
ing that practical knowledge. 
7 For a careful discussion of the issue of normativity in the area of philosophy of science, see Rodríguez 
Alcazar’s paper in this volume. 
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5. We reflect philosophically on the methods found in the case studies, developing more complex 
normative modes, which can then be applied to other case studies. 
This description is schematic and its linearity is highly misleading. It seems to suggest that we 
proceed by first doing history and then by deriving methodological principles. But of course our 
historiography is unavoidably influenced by expected methodological conclusions.” (Thagard, 
1982, pp. 27-8.) 
Later in the same paper, he claims that this methodology is not adequate to account 
for what happens in the case of logic (he understands the term in the sense of logica 
utens aforementioned, not logica docens as we are doing in this paper). The reason is that 
in the case of the logic that underlies our inferential practices in general we cannot 
identify the analogue of those special cases that led to the significant growth of scien-
tific knowledge. Therefore, the reason to vindicate a particular methodology for sci-
ence is that it has proved successful to obtain results for an independent description 
theory. As he indicates: 
“The situation in logic is rather like the situation doing historical philosophy of social science. 
Whereas in natural science there is sufficient consensus in the scientific community that selection 
of cases for study is quite uncontentious, the schisms in the various social sciences preclude do-
ing case studies whose validity would be universally accepted. For example, a study of explana-
tion in economics would get very different results if the investigator concentrated on Marx’s capi-
tal theory rather than neo-classical theories.” (Thagard, 1982, p. 32.) 
Hence, according to Thagard the problem with social sciences is that the evaluation of 
cases as successful or unsuccessful is theory-ladenned, that is to say, in Wright’s words 
paraphrased in terms of social sciences: 
... reports of explanation in economics do not count as acceptable, or unacceptable, independ-
ently of one’s economic theory, that what is proper to report oneself as going on is a function of, 
inter alia, elements of economical theory which one carries into the situation.8 
Now, let us consider the case of linguistics, as Burgess puts it: 
“The data for descriptive theorizing consist of evaluations of members of the community whose 
evaluative practices are under investigation (e.g. “That’s not good English”). […] theorists who 
are themselves members of the community (e.g. native English speakers investigating the gram-
mar of English) often use their own impressions of the felicity or infelicity of particular examples 
as their main source of data. Such impressions are intuitions in an every day sense, impressions of 
whose source and grounds one is unconscious. Intuitions in this sense are notably fallible and 
corrigible, especially in the case of a theorist out to establish a pet theory…” (Burgess, 1992, p. 
13.) 
Thus, in the case of linguistics it seems linguists develop grammars from a given prac-
tice and what they actually take into account are their own judgements, their own in-
tuitions. As Burgess points out “we do not know where those intuitions come from”. 
In case of conflict the legitimate authority is a conventionally adopted one; usually, an 
academy or institute for the considered language that is responsible for formulating 
8 The original test by Wright is: “... reports of observation do not count as acceptable, or unacceptable, 
independently of one’s empirical beliefs, that what is proper to report oneself as having observed is a 
function of, inter alia, elements of empirical theory which one carries into the observational situation” 
(Wright, 1992, p. 161). 
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the rules. In case of conflict among linguists in the academy, they should come to an 
agreement. This seems to imply that the rules the academy formulates are totally arbi-
trary; but, on the contrary, they frequently follow the intuitions of speakers among 
which the academics are. In those circumstances in which the correct grammar of a 
language that lacked an authority for sometime is being developed (Galician language 
is an example), academics try to extrapolate the rules implicit in the existing practice of 
the language in order to formulate new rules. Their task is usually far from easy becau-
se there is not a common practice against which to evaluate what is “intuitively right.” 
On its part, the normative force of the authority results from the fact that a given so-
ciety decides to delegate the task of determining which is the correct way of writing 
(speaking, spelling and so forth) a given language in an academy. Some authors —
Burgess among them— seem to think that things are quite similar in the case of logic: 
If one considers classical mathematical practice as our data and the task of the logician 
as that of describing that practice, it is the judgements of the mathematicians what the 
logician is modelling. In case there is a conflict between two mathematicians they de-
cide whether a given inference is to be accepted or not and though there is no forma-
lly constituted institution responsible for the inferences that are being accepted, the 
mathematician community itself can be seen to play that role. (More on this in the 
next section) 
 Things seem to get even worse when the prescriptive norms for the practice of liv-
ing have to do with moral affairs. In this field things are thorny, though it is usually 
clear whether a given behaviour is correct according to a considered standard. The dif-
ficulties come from the fact that there are several standards of moral behaviour and it 
is far from clear which of all those existing standards should be universally accepted. 
It is also true that there are some principles that are shared by different standards.  
 In this area, contrary to what happens in the case of prescriptive norms such as 
“don’t jump from the window” or “don’t smoke”, the problem is that at the moment 
there is no independent descriptive theory about any independent reality in terms of 
which the truth of a given moral statement can be established and it is far from clear 
whether such a reality exists. Morals /Ethics are precisely practical disciplines and one 
of their traditional problems has been how the truth of a moral/ ethical theory should 
be understood. Christine Korsgaard (Korsgaard, 1996) has maintained that four suc-
cessive answers have been given to the question of on what basis should the norma-
tivity of a given rule be vindicated:  
– Voluntarism contends that obligation derives from the command of someone 
who has a legitimate authority over the moral agent and so can make laws for 
her. You must do the right thing because God commands it, or because a po-
litical sovereign whom you have agreed to obey makes it law. Normativity 
springs from a legislative will. The solution here comes to putting in place of 
the independent scientific discipline that establishes what is true, physics or 
medicine in the scenarios above, a ‘legitimate’ authority. This authority both 
establishes what is right and determines our moral goals. The problem is why 
we are obliged to obey this authority or to conform to a social contract. 
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– Realism argues that moral claims are normative if they are true, and true if 
there are intrinsically normative entities or facts they correctly describe. Real-
ists try to establish the normativity of ethics by arguing that values or obliga-
tions or reasons really exist, or by arguing against scepticism. This proposal 
clearly aims at recovering for moral claims the sort of justification available for 
normative assertions in other fields. One main argument to defend this point 
of view has been that the alternative is scepticism. Christine Korsgaard has put 
forward that a moral sceptic is not one who does not believe in the existence 
of moral concepts but one who thinks that the explanation of moral concepts 
will be one that does not support the claims that morality makes on us.  
– Reflective endorsement (Mill, Bernard Williams): 
“Morality is grounded in human nature. Obligations and values are projections of our own moral 
sentiments and dispositions. To say that these sentiments and dispositions are justified is not to 
say that they track the truth, but rather to say that they are good. 
… 
But the normative question is one that arises in the heat of action. It is as agents that we must do 
what we are obligated to do, and it is as agents that we demand to know why. So it is not just our 
dispositions, but rather the particular motives and impulses that spring from them, that must 
seem to us to be normative.” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 91.) 
– The appeal to autonomy: Kant shares with the realist the thought that we must 
show that certain things are right and others are wrong and for that purpose a 
test is needed. But, against the realist the mentioned test is not one of knowl-
edge (or truth), but that of reflective endorsement. According to Korsgaard, 
Kant founds that we are bound by the categorical imperative (we must choose 
a law) but he does not establish that we have to follow the moral law (act only 
on maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable 
co-operative system). She tries to establish that herself. A law should provide a 
final reason —be good for its own sake— and the source for those reasons 
must rely in the internal structure of the rule, not in the action it promotes.9 
– Another methodology that has been proposed for the moral case is that of 
wide reflective equilibrium. Thagard (Thagard, 1982) makes the following re-
construction of its application to the moral case:  
“WRE  
1. We have a set of particular moral judgements about what is right or wrong, selected for ex-
pected freedom from error. 
2. We postulate a number of general moral principles which explain and justify the particular 
judgements. 
9 For a perspicuous critique of this view, see Corbí’s paper in this volume. 
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3. We attempt to come up with a maximally coherent set of beliefs, consisting not only of the 
moral judgements and principles, but also taking into account our background theories, especially 
concerning psychological limitations. 
4. We arrive at a state of reflective equilibrium, and conclude that the acceptance of the moral 
principles in the final set of beliefs is justified. 
As with HPS this description is misleadingly linear: the process of reflective equilibrium is best 
represented by the flow chart in figure two. Normative principles are outputs from the system 
only after repeated adjustments of moral judgements and principles in the light of background 
theories have been made.” (Thagard, 1982, pp. 30-31.)  
The problem with this methodology is that no justification is provided for the 
initial set of moral judgements. 
 So, to summarize what is the relation between the normative disciplines above and 
certain descriptive theories? Is there any? On what basis are those rules vindicated? In 
the case of the prescriptive sentences such as ‘don’t throw yourself through the win-
dow’ it is clear that their normative force comes from our knowledge of the truth of 
physical laws. In the case of History of Philosophy of Science, the normative force of 
the methodology that comes from the study of successful cases, that is to say, from 
the fact that we know that the outcome obtained was a major breakthrough. But the 
resulting normative force does not seem to be one of obligation. Using that method-
ology is not compulsory in every case. Also there seems to be some sort of feedback 
between expected methodological conclusions and the methodology. In the case of 
linguistics an authority legitimated by society is responsible for dictating the rules of 
the grammar of the given language and the academy makes its decisions on the basis 
of the judgements of its members. In the case of social sciences like economics it is 
quite easy to determine the sort of explanation available from the perspective of a gi-
ven economic theory (Marxist, Liberal,) but it is very difficult to determine which 
standard should be in force. In the case of ethics the problem is clearly an open one; 
to establish whether something agrees to a considered set of rules is one thing, to pro-
vide reasons to support one standard or other is quite another. 
3. Logic and wide reflective equilibrium  
The methodology of reflective equilibrium was first proposed by Nelson Goodman 
(Goodman, 1955, pp. 65-68) as an adequate epistemology for logic. Resnik has clai-
med (Resnik, 1985) that wide reflective equilibrium constitutes an adequate epistemo-
logy for normative uses of logic, while he takes it that the epistemology of descriptive 
uses of logic is in many respects similar to that in place in science: 
“Once we decide on why we want to model a particular deductive practice by means of a given 
logical theory, we start with sample cases and fit them in the model (that is, formalize them) and 
proceed from there to build a larger and larger collection of successful cases.” (Ibid., p. 229.) 
 He takes it that the methodology of wide reflective equilibrium is the adequate 
epistemology for logic when it assumes a prescriptive role because it allows us to ex-
plain why we are prepared to reform our judgements of validity. He describes it as fo-
llows: 
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“One starts with one’s own intuitions concerning logical correctness (or logical necessity). These 
usually take the form of a set of test cases: arguments that one accepts or rejects, statements that 
one takes to be logically necessary, inconsistent, or equivalent to one another. These are —in 
Rawl’s terms— one’s considered judgments. Given their subject matter, I find it convenient to 
call them considered judgments of logic. One then tries to build a logical theory whose pro-
nouncements accord with one’s initial considered judgments. It is unlikely that initial attempts will 
produce an exact fit between the theory and the ‘data’. Furthermore, committing oneself to a 
logical theory invariably entails acknowledging unforeseen and prima facie anomalous logical rela-
tionships. (The so-called paradoxes of truth-functional implication constitute a case in point.) 
Sometimes one can respond to such anomalies with a simple modification of one’s formal sys-
tem. Sometimes re-translating a prima facie anomalous argument will reconcile it with the theory. 
Sometimes, however, one will yield one’s logical intuitions to powerful or elegant systematic con-
siderations. In short, ‘theory’ will lead one to reject the ‘data’. Moreover, in deciding what must 
give, not only should one consider the merits of the logical theory per se, such as its simplicity, 
fruitfulness or elegance, and the firmness of one’s logical intuitions, but one should also consider 
how the theory and one’s intuitions cohere with one’s other beliefs and commitments, including 
philosophical ones. When the theory rejects no example that one is determined to preserve and 
countenances none one is determined to reject, then the theory and its terminal set of considered 
judgments are in, to use Rawl’s terminology, wide reflective equilibrium. The equilibrium is wide, 
because the theory is consonant not only with one’s terminal set of considered judgments of 
logic, the mark of narrow reflective equilibrium, but also with one’s broader system of beliefs.” 
(Resnik, 1997, p. 159; 2000, p. 188.)10 
 If, for the sake of the argument, one accepts without further ado Resnik’s pro-
posal, then that a logic L1 is in force can be warranted on the basis that the aforemen-
tioned logic allows us to attain reflective equilibrium. The problem is that there can be 
different systems in wide reflective equilibrium.  
“Since constructing a logical theory involves balancing various values against each other and mak-
ing choice after choice, there is no reason to expect it to lead different users to the same out-
come. Even if we could make sense of an ideal limit of logical enquiry —when all the ‘data’ are 
in— we cannot avoid the possibility of different logicians (or different communities of logicians) 
correctly applying the method to the same initial data and arriving at different outcomes.” (Res-
nik, 1997, p. 160.) 
 Thus, any person or community who had achieved wide reflective equilibrium in 
terms of another system —let us say, L2— would reject that L1 were in force. Accor-
ding to Resnik, these two people (or communities) could not even understand each 
other: 
“Since in determining reflective equilibrium one uses the logic contained in one’s own evolving 
logical theory, one might think that a theory may be in reflective equilibrium from its own inter-
nal point of view and not so from the point of view of another theory. I hesitate to draw this 
conclusion since I wonder whether one could make sense of a rival theory while remaining true 
to one’s own…. Reflective equilibrium may be a notion that is immanent to a logic rather than 
transcendent.” (Ibid.) 
 How could we decide between different systems in wide reflective equilibrium? 
Resnik speculates whether the situation would be one of incommensurability or one in 
which we would count on different standards and are unable to vindicate one instead 
of the other.  
10 For a longer account of the wide reflective equilibrium method see Resnik, 1985. 
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 It should be obvious at this point that Resnik’s proposal allows us to maintain that 
a given logic should be used because it is the logic that allows us to attain wide reflec-
tive equilibrium. But it should also be clear that such justification would be immanent 
to the system. That is to say, determining which beliefs are simultaneously acceptable 
directly depends on the assumed logic; hence there will be as many systems in wide re-
flective equilibrium as logics allow us to attain ‘equilibrium’. Thus, the problem is 
whether it makes sense to speak of “the method of reflective equilibrium, which seems 
to indicate that there is a single notion that applies to all logics” (Shapiro, 2000, p. 
350). 
 Resnik takes it that this epistemology for logic is compatible with a number of 
views about logic. I take those would all have to be anti-realist conceptions of logic 
(conventionalist, expressivist and so forth) since, from considering wide reflective 
equilibrium as an adequate epistemology for logic, Resnik concludes that in case there 
are mind independent logical facts, we cannot learn them since there might be more 
than one logic that allowed us to attain wide reflective equilibrium. Shapiro objects 
that Resnik is too quick to rule out logical realism. He takes it that from the fact that 
there could be rival logical theories for logic, it does not follow that there are no logi-
cal facts. If that were so, no realism could be defended for any area or discourse, not 
even for science and Resnik is not ready to accept that conclusion. It could also be 
said that he does not consider the possibility that his philosophy of logic is inadequate 
because it does not make sense of logical pluralism. 
 Resnik takes it that there is a fundamental difference between logical methodology 
and scientific methodology, that is probably why he rules out logical realism: 
“… I do not think we can make sense of an ideal point where logicians are bound to agree at 
least concerning the logical data. Scientists in differing circumstances are likely to begin with dif-
ferent observational data, but it is at least arguable that their opinions concerning the observa-
tional data can be made to converge by exposing them to sufficiently similar experiences. Logi-
cians, like scientists, are likely to start theory construction with different initial data. Some will see 
the proof that the Peano axioms are categorical as a logical deduction, others will argue that it in-
volves set theoretic reasoning. … But, unlike the scientific case, we cannot contrive for logicians 
to concur concerning the ‘data’ unless we do some fancy brainwashing. For it is not just a matter 
of seeing that they have similar experiences; rather it is a matter of making them come to the 
same evaluations. 
… 
I have been discussing reflective equilibrium in the hopes of showing that the epistemology of 
logical necessity and possibility —in so far as there is one— is intuition based, and unlike an ob-
servation based epistemology, nothing outside us promotes the convergence of conflicting intui-
tions concerning logical necessity and possibility. In this logical intuitions are like moral ones, and dis-
agreements about matters of logic can be as intractable as those over morals.” (Resnik, 2000, p. 
189.) 
 In what follows I will try to argue that the possibility remains open that we can 
scheme logicians to be of the same mind concerning the data, without any brainwash-
ing involved.  
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4. A scientific epistemology for logic: The view of logic as model, Shapiro’s toy example and the wide 
cosmological role criterion 
The scientific epistemology we intend to put forward as a plausible epistemology for 
logic takes it that logicians build models of mathematical practice analogously to the 
way in which scientists (biologists, physics, and so forth) build models of their fields. 
This idea has been explored by Stewart Shapiro (Shapiro, 2002), John Corcoran (Cor-
coran, 1973), and myself (Martínez, manuscript). The difficulties for this view have to 
do with the point in which the analogy with science disappears; namely, while scien-
tists do not dream of modifying the data when testing a model, our problem is 
whether the same goes for mathematical practice since our data are mathematicians’ 
judgements of correctness involved in mathematical proofs (classical mathematical 
practice). The issue is that this view of logic does not seem to permit us any reason to 
vindicate that a given mathematician should use a given logic. Shapiro has made this 
point by means of the following “toy” example:  
“... suppose that a mathematician violates the conditions on free and bound variables, but still in-
sists that her practice contains no mistakes. She claims that she has made no false conclusions, 
and we have to admit that we cannot find any in her practice. The logician points out that by ig-
noring the rules for parameters or free variables which the mathematician seems to be doing, she 
might reason from true premises to false conclusion. The mathematician retorts that the pedantic 
logician has mis-described the practice, and that she is not following the flawed rule he has at-
tributed to her, nor is she incorrectly following what the logician says is the correct rule. The lo-
gician asks her to say what rule she is following. She declines the invitation, claiming to have no 
patience for logic, but she insists that she knows what she is doing —suggesting we butt out. The 
logician might feel like Berkeley complaining about the infinitesimal calculus. And the mathema-
tician might feel like the analysts who apparently felt safe in ignoring Berkeley’s critique, for a 
time, anyway.” (Shapiro, 2002, pp. 161-162.) 
The problem for the mathematician is that the logician is applying the wrong logical 
model to explain her practice. While the logician claims that according to the model 
she is using, that inference is incorrect, in other words, it is not truth preserving. The 
view of logic as model and the notion of mathematical practice it involves do not 
convey that the mathematician can do as she likes. What Shapiro contends is that even 
if that is so, in practice, the general frame provided by the view of logic as model does 
not help to settle the issue of who can correct whom. I would say, the view of logic as 
model not only does not provide the logician with authority to correct the mathemati-
cian in the scenario above, but also establishes that it is mathematicians who have to 
decide. The logician can only correct mathematician’s judgements when the logical 
model on which she bases her evaluation has been established as an adequate model 
of the considered mathematical practice. In other words, the point is that the differ-
ence of opinion can be solved if the one who is disputing the correctness of the rule 
to the mathematician in the scenario above is a second mathematician; then the bur-
den of proof is on the roof of the first mathematician and she has to make explicit the 
rule she is using in order to convince her colleagues that her intended proof is actually 
a proof. The following is clearly a rule underlying mathematical practice: a proof will 
not be considered as such until the relevant community of mathematicians comes to 
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accept it. This conveys that experts come to an agreement. The fact that they do 
seems to imply that some sort of objectivity is captured. Thus, what is shown to be 
true by a given proof is that a mathematical statement follows from the assumptions 
in the theory. Sometimes what a proof puts forward is that a given truth obtains when 
a certain link is established with some other well-known mathematical theory, or if a 
new axiom is accepted. Mathematical proofs show that certain relations of conceptual 
necessity are in force. That is what mathematicians agree to. And the somehow inde-
pendent character of such conceptual necessities is what gives grounds to our concep-
tion of mathematical knowledge as objective —in some sense of the term. Now, those 
conceptual necessities are internal to theories. An intuitionistic mathematician agrees 
as to what follows from the current axioms in set theory and a classical mathematician 
accepts that the axiom of choice is unacceptable from an intuitionistic point of view. 
Wright (Wright, 1986) has hinted at this when he established that in order to see that a 
certain statement follows from a given set of other statements given a certain logic L, 
 L Γ → ϕ, it is not necessary to compromise with the logic. It is possible to agree 
that ϕ is deducible (or follows) from Γ according to a given logical system L, without 
subscribing to the view that L is the logic that underlies a given mathematical practice; 
where in our case  Γ would be the premises in a mathematical proof. From this point 
of view, it could be claimed that the situation posed by Shapiro in his toy example has 
to be solved by taking the dispute in front of the tribunal of the mathematical com-
munity since, however it works, it seems to be the case that mathematicians come to 
an agreement as to whether something obtains or does not obtain.  
 A somehow different problem comes up when, for instance, a classical logician or 
mathematician wants to vindicate classical logic and classical mathematical practice 
saying, against the intuitionist, that the latter should not be revised. The problem now 
is external to the theories at stake, and verdict will rely on the logical theory one enter-
tains.11 Note that this problem also arises in case the assumed epistemology is that of 
wide reflective equilibrium since it can be the case that different logics allow us to at-
tain the desired state of equilibrium. 
 At this point one issue that may be relevant to address is whether the evaluation of 
these theories actually complies with the requisite posited by Wright (Wright, 1992) on 
theory-ladenness:12 To sustain that one is in front of a problematic case of theory-
ladenness one has at least to make a case that reports of correct mathematical practice 
do not count as acceptable, or unacceptable, independently of one’s logical beliefs 
(where logical beliefs are the ones underlying a given mathematical practice); that what 
is proper to report oneself as having observed as logically sound is a function of, inter 
alia, elements of logical theory which one carries into the observational situation. Note 
that the logical theory one carries into the situation includes semantic assumptions 
11 Moreover, this situation poses an added problem: that we have to use a logic in order to de-
cide whether classical mathematical practice should be modified. 
12 Wright distinguishes four cases of theory-ladenness and points that only the one depicted above is pro-
blematic. (See Wright, 1992, pp. 160-161.) 
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that determine, for instance, whether the underlying notion of truth is a transcendent 
or epistemically constrained. 
 Different logical models are frequently compared in order to determine: which 
provides the best account of the way mathematicians reason; which deductive mecha-
nism is easier to use for a human/artificial logician; whether they are extensionally 
adequate (in the sense that they allow us to characterise the set of valid arguments); 
whether the language used has enough expressive capacity to formalise mathematical 
structures, and so forth. As a result, one logical system or another may be used de-
pending on its adequacy to attain a certain goal. For example, intuitionists reject classi-
cal logic on philosophical grounds, not because it does not succeed in explaining the 
assumptions and methodology a mathematician employs. They take it that classical 
logic cannot be an adequate model of mathematical practice because it does not pro-
vide a suitable epistemology. Classical logicians argue that intuitionist logic is unac-
ceptable because it mutilates classical mathematics, but constructivists in general and 
intuitionists in particular contend that given Bishop’s claim (Bishop, 1967) —that a 
constructive reconstruction of analysis sufficient for science has obtained— intuition-
istic logic succeeds in accounting for the interesting part of classical mathematics. 
Classical mathematicians reject the latter because, even if what constructivists contend 
were the case, that part of classical analysis that can be explained in intuitionistic terms 
is not adequate for certain foundational purposes. Besides, Shapiro (Shapiro, 2000b) 
claims that intuitionistic logic does not answer to the epistemological problems either, 
because the capacities the mathematician has to have in order to develop intuitionistic 
mathematics do not correspond to our real capacities as human beings. 
If we analyse these arguments and counterarguments it can be seen that: i) the 
dispute between intuitionists and classical logicians may be seen like a difference of 
opinion between a descriptive account of classical mathematics (a prescriptive prac-
tice) and a prescriptive account of a prescriptive practice; ii) the best argument classi-
cal logicians have waved against intuitionists is that their account mutilates classical 
mathematics, in other words, that it forces us to significantly reduce our body of 
mathematical knowledge and that knowledge has proved very useful to other disci-
plines such as physics; iii) constructivists, such as Bishop, reconstructed part of classi-
cal mathematics trying to solve mathematical problems in a way that allowed us to 
compute the result; furthermore, it is claimed that that part of classical mathematics 
they succeeded in reconstructing is enough to account for that part of mathematics 
which is relevant to science. 
 Now, let us analyse the different moves in the argument above. Clearly intuitionists 
and classical logicians have tried to solve the dispute putting forward the import that 
maintaining one position or the other has for mathematical practice. But of course, 
determining whether a given mathematical practice is right depends, to a certain ex-
tent, on the philosophical thesis we assume. This is so because our intuitions or 
judgements about the correctness of a given argument will differ depending on which 
are our philosophical views. Hence, there seems to be a problem with theory-
ladenness here: when we have to decide whether classical logic or intuitionistic logic is 
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the underlying logic of classical mathematics, our assessment of which logic is the 
right one heavily depends on the intuitions we assume in the evaluations. This is 
where Quine-Putnam’s indispensability argument comes in. Its incorporation to the 
discussion above allows us to say we have a justification for classical mathematical 
practice that is independent of judgements of mathematicians. The problem is that the 
justification available does not comprise the whole of classical mathematical practice 
but only that part that is indispensable for science. Let us agree —for sake of argu-
ment— that Bishop’s developments allow for an intuitionistic reconstruction of part 
of classical analysis and that that fragment of classical analysis obtained by intuitionis-
tic means is enough for those aspects of classical mathematics the working mathema-
tician not in logic related fields needs. If both parties agreed to the fact that both in-
tuitionistic and classical logic can be seen as accounting for 99 per cent of classical 
mathematics is all there is to this story, we would have a case of two extensionally 
equivalent though conceptually different accounts of that part of mathematics that is 
relevant to the working mathematician not in logic related fields (Feferman, S., 2000, 
p. 402).13 But, that is not the position of mathematicians working in logic-related fields 
and philosophy of mathematics. They reject Feferman’s claim because only classical 
non-constructive mathematics is enough for foundational issues.14 And the same goes 
for classical logic.  
 Let us consider the issue in terms of the Wrightean criterion of ‘wide cosmological 
role’. The wide cosmological role test is one criterion proposed by Wright in order to 
determine whether a given discourse is objective: 
“A subject matter has a wide cosmological role just in case mention of the states of affairs of 
which it consists can feature in at least some kinds of explanation of contingencies which are not 
of that sort, explanations whose possibility is not guaranteed merely by the minimal truth aptitude 
of the associated discourse” (Wright, 1992, pp. 197-8). 
 Our issue would at this point be the objectivity of mathematical practice. Given 
that, as it was said above, that part of (classical) mathematical practice that features in 
scientific explanations is the one both classical logic and intuitionistic (or constructive) 
logic can account for (assuming Bishop’s result), it is precisely that part of mathemat-
ics that satisfies the wide cosmological role requisite. Therefore, as things stand at the 
moment, that part of classical logic which is not constructive cannot be claimed to sat-
isfy it. Nonetheless, it is not clear that “non-constructive mathematics does not satisfy 
the wide cosmological role requisite since it is not necessary for physics” it is not tem-
porally indexed. The issue is whether we do know that no more mathematics than that 
99 per cent that can easily be formalised in ZFC will ever be applied, for instance to 
the development of more powerful models of physics. Imagine that it were.15 In such 
13 That 99 per cent of classical mathematics that is of interest to the working mathematician can easily be 
formalised in ZFC and that is all mathematics that is currently being applied in science. 
14 That is not so because that that 99 per cent is enough is established from outside mathematics and 
mathematicians do not judge the adequacy of their theories by, for example, the fact that they are 
used in physics. 
15 Some seem to be thinking that it is going to be. 
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a case, classical logic would feature in some kind of explanation of contingencies that 
are not of classical mathematics, whose possibility is not guaranteed merely by the 
minimal truth aptitude of constructive mathematical discourse. In other words, classi-
cal non-constructive mathematics would be said to have a wide cosmological role. 
And again, the traditional contention against intuitionistic logic would be in place. For 
the time being, applying the wide cosmological role criteria also leaves us unable to 
decide. 
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